Baba Kamma 13b — Talmud de Babylone

▶ 💬 Guemara But here, in the case of damage caused by an animal consecrated as a peace-offering, is the injured party actually able …

But here, in the case of damage caused by an animal consecrated as a peace-offering, is the injured party actually able to say: Only the meat of the animal caused damage but the sacrificial portions did not cause damage? Since the entire animal caused the damage, he does not collect the full cost of the damage from the meat portions of the one who brought the offering. Rava says: In the case of an innocuous animal consecrated as a thanks-offering that caused damage, the injured party collects damages from its meat, i.e., from the portion of the offerings that would have been eaten by the one who brought the offering, but he does not collect from its bread, i.e., from the offering of forty loaves of bread that accompanies the sacrifice of the animal. The Gemara asks: Isn’t it obvious that he does not collect from the bread? The bread is not part of the animal that caused damage. The Gemara answers: It was necessary for Rava to state this because of the latter clause of his ruling, which states: The injured party eats the meat portions of the offering according to the value of the damages owed to him, but the one achieving atonement, i.e., the one bringing the offering, brings the bread. The Gemara asks: Isn’t this also obvious? Why should anyone else bring the bread? The Gemara explains: Lest you say, since the bread is a necessary qualifying factor for the thanks-offering, as without it one does not fulfill one’s obligation, let the owner of the offering say to the one eating it, why should you eat the meat and I bring the bread? If you wish to eat, you should bring the bread. Therefore, Rava teaches us that the offering of the loaves of bread is the obligation of the owners of the offering. § The mishna teaches: One is liable only for damage caused to property that belongs to members of the covenant. The Gemara asks: This clause serves to exclude what? If it serves to exclude the property of a gentile, isn’t that already explicitly taught in the mishna below (37b): In the case of an ox of a Jew that gored an ox of a gentile, the Jew is exempt. The Gemara answers: The tanna teaches this as a principle in the mishna here and then explains it in greater detail in the mishna below. The mishna continues: One is liable only for assigned property. The Gemara asks: This clause serves to exclude what? Rav Yehuda said: This clause serves to exclude a case in which an animal is injured but it is unclear which of two oxen, owned by different people, caused the damage. The owner of this ox says to the owner of the other: Your ox caused the damage. And the owner of that ox says to the owner of the other: Your ox caused the damage. Since it cannot be proven which ox actually caused the damage, neither owner is liable. The intention of the mishna is that one is liable only where the belligerent ox is assigned to, i.e., is known to be the property of, a specific individual. The Gemara asks: Isn’t that explicitly taught in the mishna below (35a): If two oxen were seen pursuing a single ox, and then the single ox is found to be injured, and the owner of this ox says to the owner of the other: Your ox caused the damage. And the owner of that ox says to the owner of the other: Your ox caused the damage. In such a case, both of them are exempt since it is uncertain which one is guilty. The Gemara answers: The tanna teaches this as a principle in the mishna here and then explains it in greater detail in the mishna below. It was taught in a baraita in explanation of the mishna that the term assigned property serves to exclude ownerless property. The Gemara clarifies: What are the circumstances in which the mishna teaches that one is exempt? If we say it is referring to a case where an ox belonging to us, i.e., to a Jew, gored an ownerless ox, it is obvious that the owner bears no liability, as who is claiming damages from him? Rather, it must be referring to a case where an ownerless ox gored an ox belonging to us, and it teaches that the injured party does not have a right to damages. The Gemara asks: What is the point of this halakha? If the injured party wishes to recover his losses, let him go and take the belligerent ox for himself, since it is currently ownerless. The Gemara explains: The mishna teaches that the injured party does not have any right to the ox, in order to teach that in a case where another person preceded him and acquired it, the injured party has no claim to it. Ravina said an alternative interpretation of the mishna: The term assigned property serves to exclude a case in which an ox gored and subsequently its owner consecrated it, or where it gored and subsequently its owner declared it ownerless. Since the owners did not own the ox at the time the case was brought before the court, they are exempt from paying. Ravina explains that this is the intention of the mishna: That one is liable only when the property that caused the damage was owned by a responsible party both when it caused the damage and when it was tried. In this case, at the time of the court hearing it was not owned by a responsible party, as it was either consecrated or ownerless. It is also taught in a baraita: The halakha is that an ox that kills a person is stoned to death. The mishna states (44b) that this does not apply to an ox consecrated to the Temple or an ownerless ox. Moreover, Rabbi Yehuda said: Even if an ox gored and its owner subsequently consecrated it to the Temple, or if an ox gored and its owner subsequently declared it ownerless, the owner is exempt from liability, as it is stated: “And if the ox was wont to gore in time past, and had been forewarned with its owner, and he had not guarded it in, and it killed a man or a woman; the ox shall be stoned, and also its owner shall be put to death” (Exodus 21:29). The repetition of the reference to the owner at the beginning and end of the verse indicates that the ox is not stoned unless the ox’s status as the owner’s property at the time of the death of the victim and at the time of the owner’s standing trial is the same, i.e., the ox is owned by a responsible party for both events. The Gemara asks: But do we not also require that the ox’s status be the same at the time of the verdict? Isn’t the phrase: “The ox shall be stoned” written with regard to the time of the verdict? Rather, say that the owner of the ox is exempt unless the ox’s status as the owner’s property at the time of the death of the victim and at the time of the owner’s standing trial and at the verdict is the same, i.e., the ox is owned by a responsible party for all three events. § The mishna teaches: One is liable for damage caused in any place except for a domain designated exclusively for the use of the one responsible for the damage. The Gemara explains the reason for this: This is because the one liable for the damage can say to the injured party: What did your ox want in my domain? One does not have to guard his ox from causing damage within his own property, since another person’s animal has no right to be there. The mishna continues: And one is liable for damage caused in a domain designated for the joint use of the injured party and the one liable for the damage. The Gemara cites a dispute concerning this case that results in two different ways of interpreting the mishna: Rav Ḥisda says that Avimi says: With regard to a courtyard designated for the joint use of two partners, either one of them is liable for damage caused by the ox of one partner to the property of the other partner while in it, both for the category of Eating and for the category of Trampling. And accordingly, this is what the mishna is saying: One is liable for damage caused in any place except for a domain designated exclusively for the use of the one responsible for the damage, as he is exempt there; but in a domain designated for the joint use of the injured party and the one responsible for the damage, when he causes damage, the one who is responsible for the damage is obligated to pay damages. The statement in the mishna concerning a domain designated for joint use is the beginning of the following clause and introduces a case in which one is liable for damage. And Rabbi Elazar says: In a courtyard designated for joint use, one is exempt for one’s ox causing damage to the property of his partner in the category of Eating, and for one’s ox causing damage to the property of his partner in the category of Trampling. And accordingly, this is what the mishna is saying: One is liable for damage caused in any place except for a domain designated exclusively for the use of the one responsible for the damage, and one is also exempt for damage done in a domain designated for the joint use of the injured party and the one liable for the damage. The statement in the mishna about a domain designated for joint use is a continuation of the previous clause and adds an additional case in which one is exempt. And the following clause: When one causes damage, the one liable for the damage is obligated to pay damages, serves to add the fact that one is liable for damage in the framework of the category of Goring, which was not previously mentioned in the mishna. This interpretation of the concluding clause of the mishna, as a reference to Goring, works out well according to Shmuel, in his dispute with Rav (3b) concerning the meaning of Ox and Maveh in the first mishna of this chapter. According to Shmuel they mean Trampling and Eating, respectively, and Goring has yet to be addressed. But according to Rav, who says: The term ox in the mishna includes damage caused by the ox and all matters involving damaging actions that are completed by an ox, including Goring, Eating, and Trampling, Goring is already addressed in the mishna. What is added by the clause: The one liable for the damage is obligated to pay damages? The Gemara answers: It serves to add that which the Sages taught in a baraita that elucidates the mishna’s statement. The mishna states: When an animal or item one is responsible to safeguard causes damage, the one liable for the damage caused by insufficiently safeguarding it is obligated to pay payments of restitution for damage. This serves to include the cases of an unpaid bailee, a borrower, a paid bailee, and a renter, in which an animal, e.g., an ox, caused damage while in their possession. If the ox was innocuous, he pays half of the damages, and if it was forewarned, he pays the full damages. If the ox was safely enclosed and a wall broke open at night, or if bandits [listin] broke it open and the ox went out and caused damage, he is exempt from liability. The Gemara analyzes the baraita: The Master said that the mishna states: When an animal or item one is responsible to safeguard causes damage, the one liable for the damage caused by insufficiently safeguarding it is obligated to pay payments of restitution for damage. This serves to include the cases of an unpaid bailee, a borrower, a paid bailee, and a renter. The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances? If we say that the lender’s ox, which was under the watch of the borrower, injured the borrower’s ox, and the baraita is teaching that the lender is liable to pay the borrower, why is this so? Let the lender say to the borrower: If my ox had injured an ox in the world at large, i.e., someone else’s ox, you, the borrower, would be required to pay, as you were entrusted with safeguarding it. Now that my ox has injured your ox, should I be required to pay? Rather, the case must be that the borrower’s ox injured the lender’s ox, and the baraita is teaching that the borrower is liable to pay. The Gemara asks: According to this interpretation, the baraita teaches that if the belligerent ox was innocuous, the borrower is liable to pay only half of the damages. But why? Let the lender say to the borrower: By borrowing my ox, you undertook full responsibility for it such that if my ox had been injured by an ox from the world at large, you would be required to pay me for the entire value of my ox, irrespective of whether the belligerent ox was considered innocuous or forewarned. Now that it is your ox that injured my ox, should you have to pay only half of the damages? This interpretation of the baraita is also difficult. The Gemara explains: Actually, the case is where the lender’s ox injured the borrower’s ox, and with what are we dealing here? This is a case where the borrower undertook the responsibility of safeguarding the body of the lender’s ox from being injured,

▶ 🇫🇷 Résumé en français Mais ici, dans le cas d’un dommage causé par un animal consacré comme sacrifice de paix, la partie lésée peut-elle réell…

Mais ici, dans le cas d’un dommage causé par un animal consacré comme sacrifice de paix, la partie lésée peut-elle réellement dire : Seule la viande de l’animal a causé le dommage, mais les portions sacrificielles n’ont pas causé le dommage ? Puisque l’animal entier a causé le dommage, il ne perçoit pas le coût total du dommage sur les portions de viande de celui qui a apporté l’offrande. Rava dit : Dans le cas d’un animal inoffensif consacré comme sacrifice de remerciement qui a causé un dommage, la partie lésée perçoit les dommages sur sa viande, c’est-à-dire sur la portion de l’offrande qui aurait été mangée par celui qui a apporté l’offrande, mais il ne perçoit pas sur son pain, c’est-à-dire sur l’offrande de quarante pains qui accompagne le sacrifice de l’animal. La Guemara demande : N’est-ce pas évident qu’il ne perçoit pas sur le pain ? Le pain ne fait pas partie de l’animal qui a causé le dommage. La Guemara répond : Il était nécessaire que Rava le dise à cause de la dernière clause de sa décision, qui stipule : La partie lésée mange les portions de viande de l’offrande selon la valeur des dommages qui lui sont dus, mais celui qui obtient l’expiation, c’est-à-dire celui qui apporte l’offrande, apporte le pain. La Guemara demande : N’est-ce pas aussi évident ? Pourquoi quelqu’un d’autre apporterait-il le pain ? La Guemara explique : De peur que tu dises, puisque le pain est un facteur qualifiant nécessaire pour le sacrifice de remerciement, car sans lui on n’accomplit pas son obligation, que le propriétaire de l’offrande dise à celui qui le mange : pourquoi toi, tu manges la viande et moi, j’apporte le pain ? Si tu veux manger, tu devrais apporter le pain. Par conséquent, Rava nous apprend que l’offrande des pains de pain est l’obligation des propriétaires de l’offrande. § La mishna enseigne : On n’est responsable que pour un dommage causé à des biens qui appartiennent aux membres de l’alliance. La Guemara demande : Cette clause sert à exclure quoi ? Si elle sert à exclure les biens d’un gentil, n’est-ce pas déjà explicitement enseigné dans la mishna ci-dessous (37b) : Dans le cas d’un bœuf d’un Juif qui a encorné un bœuf d’un gentil, le Juif est exempt. La Guemara répond : Le tanna enseigne cela comme un principe dans la mishna ici puis l’explique plus en détail dans la mishna ci-dessous. La mishna continue : On n’est responsable que pour des biens assignés. La Guemara demande : Cette clause sert à exclure quoi ? Rav Yehuda dit : Cette clause sert à exclure un cas où un animal est blessé mais où il n’est pas clair lequel de deux bœufs, appartenant à des personnes différentes, a causé le dommage. Le propriétaire de ce bœuf dit au propriétaire de l’autre : Ton bœuf a causé le dommage. Et le propriétaire de ce bœuf dit au propriétaire de l’autre : Ton bœuf a causé le dommage. Puisqu’on ne peut pas prouver quel bœuf a réellement causé le dommage, aucun des deux propriétaires n’est responsable. L’intention de la mishna est qu’on n’est responsable que lorsque le bœuf agresseur est assigné à, c’est-à-dire connu comme étant la propriété d’, un individu spécifique. La Guemara demande : N’est-ce pas explicitement enseigné dans la mishna ci-dessous (35a) : Si deux bœufs étaient vus poursuivant un seul bœuf, et que le bœuf unique est trouvé blessé, et que le propriétaire de ce bœuf dit au propriétaire de l’autre : Ton bœuf a causé le dommage. Et le propriétaire de ce bœuf dit au propriétaire de l’autre : Ton bœuf a causé le dommage. Dans un tel cas, tous deux sont exempts puisqu’il est incertain lequel est coupable. La Guemara répond : Le tanna enseigne cela comme un principe dans la mishna ici puis l’explique plus en détail dans la mishna ci-dessous. Il a été enseigné dans une baraita en explication de la mishna que le terme biens assignés sert à exclure les biens sans propriétaire. La Guemara clarifie : Quelles sont les circonstances dans lesquelles la mishna enseigne qu’on est exempt ? Si nous disons qu’il s’agit d’un cas où un bœuf qui nous appartient, c’est-à-dire à un Juif, a encorné un bœuf sans propriétaire, il est évident que le propriétaire ne porte aucune responsabilité, car qui réclame des dommages de lui ? Plutôt, il doit s’agir d’un cas où un bœuf sans propriétaire a encorné un bœuf qui nous appartient, et il enseigne que la partie lésée n’a pas droit à des dommages. La Guemara demande : Quel est le but de cette halakha ? Si la partie lésée souhaite récupérer ses pertes, qu’il aille et prenne le bœuf agresseur pour lui-même, puisqu’il est actuellement sans propriétaire. La Guemara explique : La mishna enseigne que la partie lésée n’a aucun droit sur le bœuf, afin d’enseigner que dans un cas où une autre personne l’a précédé et l’a acquis, la partie lésée n’a aucune réclamation sur lui. Ravina dit une interprétation alternative de la mishna : Le terme biens assignés sert à exclure un cas où un bœuf a encorné et ensuite son propriétaire l’a consacré, ou où il a encorné et ensuite son propriétaire l’a déclaré sans propriétaire. Puisque les propriétaires ne possédaient pas le bœuf au moment où l’affaire a été portée devant le tribunal, ils sont exempts de payer. Ravina explique que c’est l’intention de la mishna : On n’est responsable que lorsque le bien qui a causé le dommage était possédé par une partie responsable à la fois au moment où il a causé le dommage et au moment où il a été jugé. Dans ce cas, au moment de l’audience du tribunal, il n’était pas possédé par une partie responsable, car il était soit consacré, soit sans propriétaire. Il est aussi enseigné dans une baraita : La halakha est qu’un bœuf qui tue une personne est lapidé. La mishna stipule (44b) que cela ne s’applique pas à un bœuf consacré au Te [...]

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